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THE UNDERSIZED HOUSE: A MUNICIPAL PROBLEM
ROBERT MCCLORY*
T HERE IS NO question but what building costs sharply affect the
potential size of the intended structure. When costs are low,
the floor area and cubical content of any planned building will be
apt to expand for dollars can purchase more material and services.
Conversely, as prices rise, the money allotted for building pur-
poses will purchase less, thereby forcing a reduction in size or
resulting in a finished product of inferior quality. Nowhere is
this more evident than in the field of residential building where,
under present circumstances, people desiring to build are forced
to reduce the dimensions of their dream homes to fit their limited
budgets. In much the same fashion, large-scale operators, seeking
quick profits from a ready market, find it desirable to erect row on
row of cracker-box type dwellings, devoid of ornamentation and
minute in proportion. These undersized dwellings, whether
standing alone or in rows, are not only incompatible with the char-
acter of many of our residential areas but, in the long run, cannot
make for comfortable living. The adverse effect these three or
four-room homes will have upon a residential community primarily
consisting of substantial six to eight-room dwellings, erected when
costs were lower, is obvious. To prevent that blight, the question
of whether or not a municipal ordinance designed to regulate floor
area and cubical content could be validly enacted is a matter of
prime importance to many communities.
Any attempt to prevent the erection of undersized dwellings
in Illinois, thereby preserving the character of existing residential
areas, must necessarily be predicated upon valid restrictions con-
tained in building, zoning or other ordinances.' In the past, the
* Member, Illinois Bar; Village Attorney, Village of Lake Bluff, Illinois.
1 Illustration of such an ordinance may be found in the following excerpt taken
from the zoning ordinance of the Town of Southfield, Oakland County, Michigan.
It provides: "Area of buildings: No dwelling shall be erected or altered in this
zone (Residence 1) which provides less than five hundred twenty-five (525) square
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emphasis has been, on regulation designed to limit the maximum
use which might be made of property.2 The issue now is whether
statutory authority exists for minimum regulation, for no munici-
pal ordinance can stand unless it rests upon proper statutory au-
thorization. In that respect, municipal authority for such local
legislation is to be found, if at all, in provisions permitting the
municipality to adopt building ordinances, 8 to exercise police
power,4 or to promulgate zoning ordinances.5 The first of these
may be uncertain warrant for such regulation as the power con-
ferred grants the right to "prescribe the thickness, strength and
manner of constructing all buildings and . . fire escapes there-
on." It primarily intends regulation of such things as the mate-
rials which are to enter into the finished structure or the manner
of their incorporation to the end that the building will be struc-
turally safe.
The second, i. e. police power, while worded as a blanket au-
thorization to "pass and enforce all necessary police ordinances,"
is not so unlimited as it would, at first, appear for that provision
has been interpreted to limit the police regulation to only those
subjects over which the municipality has been given express au-
thority by other specific paragraphs of the statute.6  There is,
however, some support to be found for regulation of the type
feet of floor area per family at the first floor level, exclusive of any garage area or
area in any accessory building. Size of building: No dwelling shall be erected or
altered in this zone (Residence 1) which provides less than ten thousand (10,000)
cubic feet of content."
2 Covenants in deeds or restrictions on building imposed by subdividers are beyond
the scope of this article. It has not been uncommon, in such cases, to insert pro-
visions requiring the expenditure of a stated sum, but the amount mentioned has
proved to be woefully inadequate in most instances by virtue of the staggering
increase in construction costs. In addition, such covenants customarily operate
only for a stated time, the life of which, in many Instances, has already run out.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 24, § 23-70.
4 Ibid., § 23-105.
5 Ibid., §§ 73-1 to 73-10. See also Smith-Hurd Ill. Stat. Anno., Ch. 24, § 23-1,
particularly note 2.
6 See, for example, Consumers Co. v. City of Chicago, 313 Ill. 408, 145 N. E. 114
(1924) ; Moy v. City of Chicago, 309 Ill. 242, 140 N. E. 845 (1923) ; City of Marion
v. Criolo, 278 Ill. 159, 115 N. E. 820 (1917) ; City of Chicago v. O'Brien, 268 Ill.
228, 109 N. E. 10 (1915); People v. City of Chicago, 261 Ill. 16, 103 N. E. 609
(1913) ; City of Chicago v. M. & M. Hotel, 248 Ill. 264, 93 N. E. 753 (1911) ; Wice
v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 193 Ill. 351, 61 N. E. 1084 (1901).
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under consideration in the case of Moy v. City of Chicago.7 There
an ordinance designed to regulate laundries, and which imposed
the requirement that there should be "at least 1,000 cubic feet of
air space provided for each person employed therein," was found
to be valid. The court, after referring to the grant of police power,
also found sanction for the ordinance in a specific provision au-
thorizing municipal legislation designed to promote the public
health.8 It would seem to follow, therefore, that a municipal ordi-
nance fixing a minimum size for residential buildings might well
be sustained provided there was also specific authority for its
enactment in sections of the statute dealing with building, zoning,
or the like. 9
It is under the third aspect of municipal authority, i. e.
through the use of the zoning power, that an ordinance of the type
proposed might find its greatest support. The zoning provision of
Illinois was broadened by amendment in 1943, so that its preamble
now recites the desired end to be "that adequate light, pure air,
and safety from fire and other dangers may be secured, that the
taxable value of land and buildings throughout the municipality
may be conserved, that congestion in the public streets may be
lessened or avoided, and that the public health, safety, comfort,
morals, and welfare may otherwise be promoted."10
To accomplish those purposes, each municipality has been em-
powered, among other things, to (1) regulate and limit the height
and bulk of buildings hereafter to be erected; (2) to establish,
regulate and limit the building or set-back lines on or along any
street, traffic-way, drive or parkway; (3) to regulate and limit the
intensity of the use of lot areas, and to regulate and determine the
area of open spaces, within and surrounding such buildings; (4) to
classify, regulate and restrict the location of trades and industries
7 309 Ill. 242, 140 N. E. 845 (1923).
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 24 § 23-81.
9 Father Basil's Lodge v. City of Chicago, 393 ll. 246, 65 N. E. (2d) 805 (1946);
City of Bloomington v. Wirrick, 381 Ii. 347, 45 N. E. (2d) 852 (194-3); Moy v.
City of Chicago, 309 Ill. 242, 140 N. E. 845 (1923). See also Brougher v. Board
of Public Works, 107 Cal. App. 15, 290 P. 140 (1930).
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 24, § 73-1.
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and the location of buildings designed for specified industrial,
business, residential, and other uses; (5) to divide the entire
municipality into districts of such number, shape, area, and of such
different classes (according to use of land and buildings, height
and bulk of buildings, intensity of the use of lot area, area of open
spaces, or other classification) as may be deemed best suited;
(6 )to fix standards to which buildings or structures therein shall
conform; and (7) to prohibit uses, buildings, or structures in-
compatible with the character of such districts.1
The statute referred to appropriately closes with the admoni-
tory remark that in all ordinances passed "due allowance shall
be made for existing conditions, the conservation of property
values, the direction of building development to the best ad-
vantage of the entire municipality and the uses to which the
property is devoted at the time of the enactment of such an ordi-
nance," and that the power so conferred shall not be exercised
"so as to deprive the owner of any existing property of its use
or maintenance for the purpose to which it is then lawfully de-
voted, but provision may be made for the gradual elimination of
uses, buildings and structures which are incompatible with the
character of the districts in which they are made or located." 2
Certain parts of the present statute clearly indicate a purpose
to carry out original zoning concepts, to-wit: that in the interest
of public health, safety and welfare regulation may well be im-
posed prescribing maximum limits on height and bulk of buildings,
fixing their location with respect to lot lines, as well as to control
the uses to which structures may be put. It cannot be said, how-
ever, that in the interest of regulating maximums, the legislature
has overlooked the desirability of fixing minimum standards, for
there is much in the statute which looks in that direction. The
preamble, for example, suggests the desirability of conserving
the "taxable value of land and buildings" as well as preserving
the "public health, safety, comfort, morals, and welfare." There
11 Ibid., subsection (1) to (7).
12 Ibid., concluding paragraph.
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is specific authority for the "regulation" of, as well as limitation
upon, the height and bulk of buildings. Standards may be estab-
lished to which buildings and structures are to conform. Each
municipality may prohibit uses, buildings or structures "incom-
patible with the character" of established zoning districts. But
above all, with due regard to private rights, the municipality
may act to secure the "conservation of property values, the
direction of building development to the best advantage of the
entire municipality" in addition to bringing about the gradual
elimination of uses, buildings and structures which are "incom-
patible" with the character of the districts in which they are
located.
Regulation in these respects must, of necessity, take into
account the fact that values may be as effectively destroyed or
diminished by the introduction of cheap, shoddy, or skimpy con-
struction as they would be by permitting overbuilding in the
area. Health and comfort may be as seriously endangered in
residential areas by inadequate and insufficient housing as they
would be by the introduction of pest houses, factories and the like.
It would seem, then, that a zoning ordinance which prescribed
minimum dimensions for residential building, unless otherwise
shown to be arbitrary or unreasonable, should be valid in Illinois,
although it must be admitted there are no known decisions in
this state dealing precisely with the subject.
Attempts to secure these ends in other states have met with
varying success. Probably the leading case on the point is the
decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan in the case of Senefsky
v. La/wler.13 It was there held that a zoning ordinance which
required a minimum floor area of 1300 square feet was unreason-
able and invalid as applied to a plaintiff whose building plans
called for 980 square feet of usable floor space.14 The decision
13 307 Mich. 728, 12 N. W. (2d) 387, 149 A. L. R. 1433 (1943). Bushnell, J., wrote
a dissenting opinion concurred in by Butzel, J.
14 An analogous situation in this state would probably be found only in commu-
nities located In resort areas where housing accommodations are usually of
temporary character. Very few persons, in average residential areas, would desire
a reduction in minimum area requirements.
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cannot be said to stand for the proposition that all minimum
standards are invalid, for the court was careful to note that a
very substantial portion of existing dwellings in the area did
not measure up to the ordinance there sought to be applied, that
a large number of vacant lots would be materially restricted, and
that there was uncontradicted testimony to the effect that " 'there
were a lot of people who wanted to build smaller houses and they
couldn't build them after the ordinance was enacted.' "15 It fur-
ther appeared that plaintiff's contemplated structure would be
in as full accord with the requirements of public safety, health
and welfare, as one having a larger area of floor space. The
majority were content to order the issuance of a building permit,
saying it was not "necessary for decision . . . and we do not
hold that under proper circumstances a municipality may not
exercise its delegated police power"' 16 in the manner there
attempted.
The dissenting opinion of Judge Bushnell is even more force-
ful on the point. He wrote:
This question of minimum floor area is one of first impression
in this State. At the outset, we are confronted with the
elementary propositions that every intendment is in favor
of the constitutionality of an ordinance and the plaintiff
must bear the burden of showing that the one in question
has no real or substantial relation to public health, morals,
safety or general welfare . . . [The] power to zone is not
limited to a protection of the status quo, and the city may
validly plan its future development . . . [Ordinances] having
for their purpose regulated municipal development, the se-
curity of home life, the preservation of a favorable environ-
ment in which to rear children . . . the safeguarding of
the economic structure upon which the public good depends,
the stabilization of the use and value of property . . . are
within the proper ambit of the police power . . . The legis-
15 307 Mich. 728 at 738, 12 N. W. (2d) 387 at 389.
16 307 Mich. 728 at 742, 12 N. W. (2d) 387 at 390.
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lative authorities in the City of Huntington Woods are better
acquainted with the necessities of their city than we are .
They are also better able to determine whether the ordinance
in question will accomplish the desired result of stabilizing
and preserving property values . . . We cannot say that the
requirement . . . is clearly unreasonable because, under the
circumstances, it is at least a debatable question. Whether
or not the means adopted by defendant City will accomplish
the desired end is also debatable. That being the case, we
cannot substitute our judgment for that of the legislative
body which is charged with the responsibility of deciding
that question. 17
Viewed in that light, the decision in the Senefsky case is not
conclusive even though it appears to have been followed in two
later decisions from the same state.' In the most recent of
these, that of Elizabeth Lake Estates v. Waterford,19 the primary
reason for nullifying the minimum floor area requirement, there
fixed at 500 square feet, appears to have been the fact that the
township ordinance in question applied to only two square miles
out of the total thirty-six square miles in the township, the bal-
ance being left unzoned. When it is remembered that the Michi-
gan statute is not nearly as broad as the one found in this state, 20
and that there is at least tacit recognition in the Senefsky case
for some minimum standard, although perhaps not as high as the
17 307 Mich. 728 at 733-4, 12 N. W. (2d) 387 at 392.
18 Frischkorn v. Lambert, 315 Mich. 556, 24 N. W. (2d) 209 (1946) ; Elizabeth
Lake Estates v. Waterford, 317 Mich. 359, 26 N. W. (2d) 788 (1947).
19 317 Mich. 359, 26 N. W. (2d) 788 (1947).
20Mich. Comp. Laws 1929, Vol. 1, § 2634, provides: "The legislative body of
cities and villages may regulate and limit the height and bulk of buildings here-
after erected, and regulate and determine the area of yards, courts, and other
open spaces, and for such purposes divide any city or village into districts of such
number, shape and area as may be deemed best suited to carry out the purposes
of this section. Such regulations shall be uniform for each class of buildings
throughout each district, but the regulations in one (1) district may differ from
those in other districts. Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a
plan designed to lessen congestion on the public streets, to promote public health,
safety and general welfare, and shall be made with reasonable consideration, among
other things, to the character of the district, its peculiar suitability for particular
uses, the conservation of property values and the general trend and character of
building and population development." See also Mich. Stat. Ann. 1936 § 5.2932.
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1300 square feet there required, the way is still left open for
some form of regulation.2'
Similar questions have been considered in other states. The
Nebraska Supreme Court, in Baker v. Somerville,22 reversed
a trial court decree which had enjoined the defendants from pro-
ceeding with the erection of a one-story home containing approxi-
mately 1500 square feet of floor space as being in violation of a
city ordinance placing a minimum of 2000 square feet on one-
story residences. The zoning provision was extended to cover de-
fendants' property after the lot had been purchased, after a
building permit had been obtained, and after some $5,600 had
been invested in the partially completed structure. It seems to
have been conceded that the purpose of the ordinance was to dis-
courage the construction of one-story residences in an area where
other homes were two stories in height. The upper court not
only refused to give the ordinance retroactive effect but also de-
clared that a zoning provision could not be sustained on aesthetic
grounds alone as such would not "promote public health, safety,
morals or the general welfare. "2 Such language is clearly in ac-
cordance with general rules governing zoning regulations, but it
would not necessarily render invalid the minimum floor area
requirement, especially if the latter bore a reasonable relationship
to the character of existing buildings in the area involved.
21 In the unreported case of Most v. Township of Southfield, decided in 1944,
the Circuit Court of Oakland County, Michigan, upheld the ordinance quoted in
note 1, ante, fixing a minimum floor area of 525 square feet, on the ground that
there was no showing that the ordinance did not bear a reasonable relationship to
the welfare, peace and public health of the community, the court declaring that the
size of a building might have direct bearing on public health and welfare. Citation
supplied by the Chicago Regional Planning Association. In the more recent case of
Thompson v. City of Carrolton, 211 S. W. (2d) 970 (Tex. Civ. App., 1948), the
plaintiff sought to enjoin the enforcement of a part of a city zoning ordinance
which required a minimum floor area of 900 square feet. Plaintiff's application to
build a home containing an area of 752 square feet had been denied. The Court of
Civil Appeals, affirming the trial court, held that the section of the ordinance at-
tack was not unreasonable and that the minimum floor area requirement bore a
reasonable relationship to the general welfare. It declined to hold that the case
of Senefsky v. Lawler, 307 Mich. 728, 12 N. W. (2d) 387 (1943), was contra,
referring to distinguishing language in the majority opinion and also quoting with
approval from portions of the dissenting opinion.
22 138 Neb. 466, 293 N. W. 326 (1940).
23 138 Neb. 466 at 471-2, 293 N. W. 326 at 329.
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As a matter of fact, the same court, in the later case of Dundee
Realty Company v. City of Omaha,24 distinguished the earlier
holding of the Baker case when it sustained the validity of an
ordinance requiring a minimum area requirement of 1200 square
feet for two-story dwellings and of 1000 square feet for one-story
homes. After pointing out that the ordinance involved in the
Baker case had been repealed subsequent to the decision therein
and had been replaced with the one under consideration, the
court went on to state that the case before it did not conflict with
the earlier holding. It said:
The facts are not analogous. In that case, the engineer
testifying to parts of the ordinance now repealed stated that
the section in question was zoned purely for aesthetic reasons,
while in the instant case the facts deal decisively with the wel-
fare, morals and safety of the people of the city of Omaha
.. We hold . . . that such ordinance is not arbitrary or
unreasonable, as applied to plaintiff's land, but is to the
best intersts of the city of Omaha . . . [and is] constitu-
tional and valid.25
It may be said, then, that if an ordinance is predicated upon clear
evidence of necessity in the interest of public health, safety, and
the like, there is every reason to believe that it should withstand
attack.
The Maryland Court of Appeals, in the case of County Com-
missioners of Anne Arundel County v. Ward,26 likewise sustained
the denial of a writ of mandamus by which it was sought to compel
the issuance of a building permit for the erection of several rustic
cabins. The application for a license had been denied by the
lower court for non-compliance with a county zoning ordinance
which provided in part, that the area involved was to be "strictly
residential . . . limited to one-family residences . . . no house
shall be constructed to contain less than 3200 cubic feet." The
24 144 Neb. 448, 13 N. W. (2d) 634 (1944).
25 144 Neb. 448 at 455, 13 N. W. (2d) 634 at 637.
26 186 Md. 330, 46 A. (2d) 684 (1946).
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higher court, without commenting specifically on the subject of
the cubic feet requirement, held that the denial of the permit was
not arbitrary nor unreasonable.
27
A slightly different type of ordinance was involved in the
Florida case of City of West Palmn Beach v. State,28 for it di-
rected that "every new building or structure must substantially
equal that of the adjacent buildings or structures in said subdi-
vision in appearance, square foot area and height." Upon com-
plaint against the building inspector who had refused to per-
mit the erection of a five-room house, that portion of the ordi-
nance was declared invalid for the obvious reason that it provided
no adequate standards to be followed by the administrative of-
ficer, the failure to specify a minimum floor area appearing to
be the primary point for criticism. As the court itself observed,
when regulations of this type are to be imposed in order to pro-
mote health, welfare, safety and morals "it is necessary that
exactions be fixed in the ordinance with such certainty that they
not be left to the whim or caprice of the administrative agency." 29
So far as height is concerned, it is not felt that any useful
analogy could be made between the instant problem and cases
in which minimum height regulations have been considered.30
For one thing, the present popularity of ranch-type houses and
other one-story residences would seem to make obsolete decisions
such as that in City of Mobridge v. Brown31 which overthrew an
ordinance prohibiting one-story buildings, obviously designed to
prevent the spread of bungalows. In that regard a nip and
tuck decision by the highest court of New Jersey in the case of
27 The court was likewise not convinced by the argument that the "technical
violation of the regulations" should be excused in view of the "housing shortage."
See 186 Md. 330 at 340, 46 A. (2d) 684 at 688. See also Potts v. Board of Adjust-
ment, 133 N. J. L. 230, 43 A. (2d) 850 (1945), where an application to convert a
single-family dwelling to a two-family apartment, because of the "critical housing
shortage," was denied.
28-Fla.-, 30 So. (2d) 491 (1947).
29 -Fla.- at-, 30 So. (2d) 491 at 492.
30 The case of Brown v. Board of Appeals, 327 Ill. 644, 159 N. E. 225 (1927),
held invalid a provision of a zoning ordinance requiring that buildings in a certain
business area had to be "not less than forty feet" in height. See also annotation
on the point In 56 A. L. R. 247.
3139 S. D. 270, 164 N. W. 94 (1917).
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Brookdale Homes Incorporated v. Johnson32 is of more than pass-
ing interest,33 for it too dealt with an ordinance regulating
maximum and minimum heights for buildings in residential areas.
That ordinance specified that no building should be "erected
to a height in excess of 35 feet" or "with its roof ridge less
than 26 feet above the building foundation." It was held in-
valid, by a vote of seven to six, when the majority adopted and
approved a lower court opinion attacking the minimum height
limitation as an attempt to legislate a minimum cost.
An excerpt from the lower court opinion illustrates one side
of the argument. That court wrote:
It is insisted that the presence of buildings less than 26 feet
in height does not tend to conserve the value of property,
but rather tends to reduce ratables and thus increase the
general tax burden. The testimony of the single witness to
that effect lacks persuasion. . . . But be that as it may,
there is persuasive proof that there is a substantial demand
for one story houses in the neighborhood and that the cost
of construction of such houses may often be equal to, if not
greater than, the costs of construction of two or two and one-
half story houses. And, as pointed out for prosecutor, if
respondents' theory be sound, a municipality under the cloak
of its zoning power, might provide that no house costing less
than a certain sum should be erected in a specified area. This
it cannot legally do. For obviously such a provision or regu-
lation could not properly be said to be made 'with a view of
conserving the value of property and encouraging the most
appropriate use of land throughout such municipality.'
No person under the zoning power can legally be deprived
of his right to build a house on his land merely because the
cost of that house is less than the cost of his neighbor's
house.3 4
32123 N. J. L. 602, 10 A. (2d) 477 (1940), affirmed in 126 N. J. L. 516, 19 A.
(2d) 868 (1941).
33 It should be remembered that the Illinois Supreme Court, in Brown v. Board
of Appeals, 327 Ill. 644, 159 N. E. 225 (1927), relied largely on the earlier New
Jersey case of Dorison v. Saul, 98 N. J. L. 112, 118 A. 691 (1922).
34 123 N. J. L. 602 at 605-6, 10 A. (2d) 477 at 478.
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The dissenting opinion written by Justice Heher, concurred
in by five other justices, is much more persuasive. After com-
menting on the factual situation,3" the justice continued:
The classification in this respect is not unreasonable or ar-
bitrary. I hold the opinion that the general zoning scheme
takes the category of a reasonable regulation for public con-
venience, prosperity and welfare; and the particular provi-
sion is justly classable as an integral part of the plan. If,
for reasons of public safety and the like, dwelling houses
may be limited to a fixed maximum height, so also may a
minimum height be prescribed if reasonably necessary to
secure the use for which the land in the district is peculiarly
suitable, considered from the standpoint of the community at
large, and thus to conserve its character and value and pro-
mote the general prosperity and welfare. If not, dwellings
even less in keeping with the character of the district, e. g.,
shacks and the like, would be unobjectionable. Can it be
that our sovereignty is so circumscribed that one-room shan-
ties may not be excluded from a community peculiarly suited
to materially higher residential uses, and devoted to such,
even though this radical departure will substantially depre-
ciate property values and otherwise disserve the essential
public interest? In this behalf, the difference between such
structure and the common bungalow would seen to be one
of degree merely and not of kind; certainly, such classifi-
cation is not to be condemned as palpably unreasonable, arbi-
trary or oppressive. As said, we are not at liberty to nullify
a legislative enactment unless its constitutional invalidity is
not open to reasonable doubt. . . . Viewed as a whole, the
regulations are designed, not for the special benefit of par-
35 The court said there was evidence "tending to show that the use thus pre-
scribed, considered in relation to the character and location of the land, and the
existent dwelling houses and the general zoning scheme, is the most appropriate
and suitable; and that the erection of the banned bungalow type of structure upon
the vacant land in the district would result in a depreciation of land values and
a reduction of ratables to a degree materially affecting the public welfare. Re-
spondent is the owner of 'undeveloped' land in the district to the extent of 'about
3000 feet frontage'; and it is proposed to use these plots, in large part at least, for
the erection of bungalows to meet a 'demand for all living rooms on one floor.'
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ticular landowners, but for the material advancement of
the entire community as a social, economic and political unit. 6
It would seem that identical reasoning can well be applied with
respect to minimum floor area provisions.
While regulations of this character have not received en-
tirely favorable treatment at the hands of courts, there is enough
to indicate that if they are not applied in arbitrary fashion to
existing conditions,3 7 nor made invalid by retroactive features"8
or lack of suitable standards,89 there is some occasion to believe
zoning restrictions of the kind in question may be upheld in Illi-
nois. 40  Municipal officers, then, should be realistic and fortify
their intended action with adequate data assembled in advance
to meet constitutional attack. Before adopting such an ordinance,
a survey should be made of existing residences in the area to
be zoned. That survey should include not only the over-all size
of the buildings but the size of the room units as well. It might
even be wise to establish tables of valuation to show how taxables
might be affected by the erection of incompatible structures. From
such data, a reasonable and proper minimum area requirement
could then be calculated consistent with the realities of the situa-
tion. So fortified, it is doubted that authority for the adoption
of such a plan would be denied to the municipality. To hold other-
wise would mean that municipalities would be powerless to pre-
vent the erection of one, two or three room shacks in well-to-do
neighborhoods so long as the former met the bare structural re-
quirements of a municipal building code. 41
36 126 N. J. L. 516 at 527, 19 A. (2d) 868 at 873.
37 Senefsky v. Lawler, 307 Mich. 728, 12 N. W. (2d) 387, 149 A. L. R. 1433 (1943);
Elizabeth Lake Estates v. Waterford, 317 Mich. 359, 26 N. W. (2d) 788 (1947).
38 Baker v. Somerville, 138 Neb. 466, 293 N. W. 326 (1940).
39 City of West Palm Beach v. State, - Fla. -, 30 So. (2d) 491 (1947).
40 See, in support thereof, County Commissioners v. Ward, 186 Md. 330, 46 A.
(2d) 648 (1946) ; Dundee Realty Co. v. City of Omaha, 144 Neb. 448, 13 N. W.
(2d) 634 (1944).
41 It is believed that a stronger case for minimum floor area requirements can
be made out under the zoning powers granted by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 24,§§ 73-1 to 73-10. The possibility that a building ordinance might find approval
as a proper exercise of the police power, in the light of the decision in Moy v.
City of Chicago, 309 Ill. 242, 140 N. U. 845 (1923), should not be overlooked.
